Truman's Motivations:
Using the Atomic Bomb in the Second World War
John W. Cooper
Saturday, December 9, 2000
© 2000 John W. Cooper
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Available online as a PDF
CONTENTS:
Introduction 0
Benefits of
Using the Atomic Bomb for Truman’s Administration 0
Troubling
Question About the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb 0
Soviet Union’s Effects
on Japan and the United States
The Call for
Unconditional Surrender
After the Potsdam Declaration—the
Necessity of the Bomb
Conclusion
Works Cited
INTRODUCTION:
"A bright light filled the plane. The first
shock wave hit us. We were eleven and a half slant miles from the atomic
explosion, but the whole airplane cracked and crinkled from the blast” recalled
Colonel Paul Tibbets, the pilot who dropped the atomic bomb on Japan
(Seattletimes.com). Truman was a great champion of the atomic bomb. In addition to playing an essential role in
ending World War II, the atomic bomb served Truman in several other ways. The use of the atomic bomb at the end of the
war helped the Truman administration avoid congressional investigations into
the clandestine development and the cost of the atomic bomb, permitted the United States to retaliate against Japan for Pearl Harbor, and allowed Truman to
use the atomic bomb as a bargaining tool with the Soviet
Union. Because of these
benefits, some historians have suggested that Truman did not pursue all
reasonable measures to secure Japan's
surrender before the use of the atomic bomb.
If Truman’s goal was to end the war as soon as possible, why did he
attempt to delay the Soviet Union’s entry into
the war? Furthermore, why did he fail to
modify the demand for Japan’s
unconditional surrender if he knew not guaranteeing the post-war existence of
the emperor’s position was a barrier to Japan's surrender? Upon critical examination, however, one can
determine that Truman hoped to end the war as soon as possible without paying
Stalin too high a price for the Soviet Union's
intervention. Moreover, neither the
clarification of the Emperor's post-war position nor the Soviet Union’s entry
into the war would have led to Japan's
surrender; and therefore the atomic bomb was necessary and responsible for
forcing Japan's
capitulation.
Benefits of Using
the Atomic Bomb for Truman’s Administration:
The incredible cost of developing the
atomic bomb was itself an incentive for its use in World War II. The cost of creating the atomic bomb was
approximately two billion dollars (Sherwin, 138). If you convert that cost into today’s dollars
the cost of its development would near $20 billion (Brooks.edu). To put this in perspective, in today’s
dollars the total cost of all the bombs, mines, and grenades used throughout
the entire Second World War was only $31.5 billion and the total cost of all
the small arms materiel used in the entire war was only $24 billion
(Brooks.edu). Since the atomic bomb’s
development was hidden from congress and the American public throughout the war,
Byrnes, the director of the Office of War Mobilization, was concerned that if “the
project proves a failure, it will then be subjected to relentless
investigations and criticism” (Sherwin, 200).
Likewise Groves revealed more concerns in his memorandum written about
two weeks before Roosevelt’s death: “[Roosevelt] was certain that the weapon
would bring the war to a rapid conclusion, thereby justifying the years of
effort, the vast expenditures, and the judgement of the officials responsible
for the project" (Sherwin, 145).
Furthermore, after the Germans were defeated, the Allied effort to
develop the atomic bomb increased. Opprenheimer recalled after the war: “I
don’t think there was any time where we worked harder at the speed-up than in
the period after the German surrender and the actual use of the bomb…." (Sherwin, 145). The atomic bombs’ role in terminating the war
did prevent endless investigations of the Truman administration. Although it is impossible to enter Truman’s
mind, one can speculate that its cost provided an incentive for its use.
Furthermore, Truman may have used the
atomic bomb to retaliate against Japan
for their attack on Pearl Harbor. After hearing of the results of the raid
against Hiroshima,
Truman spoke biting words about the atomic bomb's destruction: “This is the
greatest thing in history” (Sherwin, 221).
This does not prove that Truman's principle motivation for using the
atomic bomb was to retaliate, but Pearl Harbor was in Truman's memory: “Nobody
is more disturbed over the use of atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly
disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their
murder of our prisoners of war" (Alperovitz, 563). In defending the use of the atomic bomb he
particularly mentioned Pearl Harbor, and the
brutality that the Japanese inflicted upon American prisoners of war. Truman's diction suggests that he harbored
resentment towards Japan:
"The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using
to bombard them. When you have to deal
with a beast you have to treat him as a beast….” (Alperovitz, 563). Although it is impossible to determine what
Truman thought or felt one can speculate that Japan’s brutality played a role in
his decision to use the atomic bomb.
The United
States most certainly considered Russia a factor in the early development of the
atomic bomb: “There was never from about two weeks from the time I [Groves] took charge of this Project any illusion on my
part but that Russia
was our enemy….” (Sherwin, 62).
Roosevelt, the president of the United States before Truman, also
shared this view: “[The] President began to deal with atomic energy as an
integral part of his general diplomacy, linking and encompassing both the
current wartime situation and the shape of postwar affairs” (Sherwin, 84). Roosevelt was also cognizant of how Churchill
hoped the atomic bomb could be used as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union (Sherwin, 68). Likewise from the very onset of the project Groves viewed Russia
as America’s
enemy. Roosevelt was made totally aware
of the possible political implications of using the atomic bomb as Simpson
discussed with Roosevelt “the idea of using the [atomic bomb] as a bargaining
counter in postwar negotiations with the Soviet Union” (Sherwin, 166). Furthermore Chairman of the OSRD (Atomic Energy
Executive Committee) wrote that the “major consideration must be that of
national security and postwar strategic significance” (Sherwin, 80). From the earliest stages of the atomic bomb's
development politicians were considering its postwar significance.
Truman’s advisors
heavily influenced Truman’s feeling towards the Soviet
Union. Truman became president of the United
States following Roosevelt’s
tragic death. And since Roosevelt and
Truman were not the best of friends to say the least (which is in and of itself
an interesting matter) Truman was relatively uninformed about the atomic bomb’s
development and Roosevelt's international policies relating to the Soviet Union.
Truman felt bound by Roosevelt’s former policy to use the atomic bomb in
the war, and not to open up negotiations with the Soviet Union because he had
not been elected president; Roosevelt had won
this position (Sherwin, 146). His lack
of information also allowed his advisors to easily mold his opinion of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt had not kept Truman informed of
his foreign policy; therefore, when Truman became president he lacked his own
foreign policy, and consequently adopted the foreign policy of his advisors. In describing how Truman’s policy was shaped
Kissinger said, "Soviet policies were explained to Truman in inherent bad
faith model. [It is] clearly
self-perpetuating for the model itself denies the existence of data that could
disconfirm it” (Sherwin, 153). From the
earliest outset Truman's advisors painted the Soviet Union
in the worst possible light.
Additionally, it was the belief of Stimson, Truman and Byrnes that only
after the power of the atomic bomb was shown would the Soviet Union become
accepting of America’s
point of view and territorial objectives (Sherwin, 194). Truman’s advisors convinced him that if the
atomic bomb was used the Soviet Union, an
enemy, might be kept at bay.
Troubling question about the decision to use the atomic bomb:
There is some evidence that suggests that
the atomic bomb was not necessary to secure Japan's surrender. If the bomb was truly developed to end the
war as soon as possible, why wasn't the future existence of the position of the
Emperor guaranteed? This appears
contradictory, since his position was maintained after the war. Why wasn't the Soviet
Union's intent made clearer?
Nevertheless, “On August 6 an American B-29 dropped an atomic bomb on
Hiroshima without warning, devastating the city and killing as many as 80,000
people” (Sigal, 2). From a humanitarian
point of view if the use of the atomic bomb could have been avoided Hiroshima was a great
tragedy. There is some support for this
speculation. The United States’
Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that "in all probability prior to 1
November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not
been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion
had been planned or contemplated” (Alperovitz, 645). In spite of this statement, however, if one
carefully examines this survey, one realizes it did not accurately reflect Japan’s willingness
to surrender.
Additionally, air force General Curtis LeMay
insulted the use of the atomic bomb, calling the new weapon “the worst thing
that every happened…. Even without the atomic bomb and the Russian entry into
the war, Japan
would have surrendered in two weeks” (Sigal, 178). At first glance this statement in unsettling,
however, the motivation of the pilot must be considered. The air force was not a champion of the
atomic bomb. They would rather show that
the conventional bombing campaigns alone were responsible for driving Japan
to its knees. Atomic bombs, unlike bombing
campaigns, only require a few airplanes and would not necessitate a large air force. Nevertheless, the troubling question has been
raised: Was the atomic bomb necessary, and was every reasonable measure taken
to force Japan's
surrender before its use?
Soviet Union’s effects on Japan and the
United States:
Until the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Japan, many Japanese hoped the Soviet Union would intervene on their behalf: “Notwithstanding
Sato’s warnings that the Soviets would not alter the terms of the Potsdam
Declaration, the summary characterized Togo as still blindly bent on ‘fly[ing]
into the arms of Russia’ despite ‘the possibility that Russia might not be
there to catch him’ ” (Frank, 238). Near the end of the war, however, Togo was convinced that the Soviet Union had no
intention of helping Japan,
because they had already made agreements with America
to divide up the spoils of war upon Japan's defeat:
Togo
lacked the one thing he needed to be convincing [in 1945]: he lacked concrete
evidence. He was thus caught between his
own desire to see the war terminated as soon as possible and the army’s
insistent demand that he undertake immediately to court the Soviet
Union (Butow, 79).
All
of Japan's officials did not
blindly hope that the Soviet Union would save
them. Unfortunately the officials who
harbored this belief did not have the evidence they needed to persuade a
majority of the governmental officials that this was true. The Japanese still hoped the Soviet Union
might intervene on their behalf when the atomic bomb was dropped and the
Russian army invaded Manchuria (Butow,
149). The fact that Japan was completely ignorant of Russian plans
to invade Manchuria is support for this
idea. The Japanese military official estimate
of Russian forces was three Infantry divisions stationed at the Manchurian border
when there were actually fifteen divisions, and the estimate stated that there
were two to three tank brigades when there were actually eight brigades (Frank,
289). Obviously, the Soviet
Union's attack surprised the Japanese. When the invasion began on
August 9 General Headquarters stated that the “scale of these attacks is not
large” (Frank, 289). Even once the
invasion had begun the Japanese were in denial that in fact this was the
beginning of a full-scale invasion.
Russia harbored aspirations of territorial
expansion in East Asia. This can be seen by looking at both Stalin’s
and the Soviet Union's behavior. Stalin expected that for Russia’s assistance in the defeat of Japan “Russia
will share in the actual occupation of Japan” (Frank, 217). This at one time was a concession that the United States
was willing to make. However with the
advent of the atomic bomb the United
States no longer desired Soviet
assistance. Stalin still then tried to
gain territory and influence even when his help was not needed. This can be seen because after the Soviet
Union was caught off guard by the United States’ surprise use of the atomic
bomb: “[Stalin] decided to enter the war on 9 August, a week earlier than
previously scheduled, or a week earlier than President Truman had anticipated”
(Bix, 104). The Soviet Union desired to
share in the spoils of war by joining in the war against Japan.
United States government officials hoped to keep the
Soviet Union out of East Asia. In Byrnes' book, Speaking Frankly,
Byrnes wrote: “As for myself, I must frankly admit that… I would have been
satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war” (Alperovitz,
274). Here is clear, first hand,
evidence that after obtaining the atomic bomb the United States did not desire Soviet
assistance. This view was also expressed
by Secretary of War Stimson: “[If] the Russians seek joint occupation after a
creditable participation in the conquest of Japan, I do not see how we could
refuse them at least a token occupation” (Sigal, 135). Grew agreed: “Once, Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia,
Manchuria, and Korea will
gradually slip into Russia’s
orbit” (Sigal, 97). Therefore it is
undeniable that many powerful people involved in the war effort did not want
the Soviet Union to be involved in Japan’s defeat.
Once Truman knew that the United States
had developed an atomic bomb that had proven effective in tests, he supported
the bomb’s use. Truman, unfortunately,
revealed very little about his own ideology so it is difficult to put reasons
behind his actions. However, after
looking at the August 15, 1960 issue of U.S. News and World Report, one can
gain valuable insight into Truman's psyche.
Byrnes was interviewed and asked:
“Was
there a feeling of urgency to end the war in the Pacific before the Russians
became too deeply involved?” and he responded: “There certainly was on my part,
and I’m sure that, whatever views President Truman may have had of it earlier
in the year, that in the days immediately preceding the dropping of the bomb
his views were the same as mine- we wanted to get through the Japanese phase of
the war before the Russians came in” (Alperovitz, 274).
This
did not come out for a number of years because of possible political ramifications,
but this is significant evidence that Truman wanted to end the war without
Soviet intervention. At this time Byrnes
had no reason to be untruthful or mislead the American public. In 1960 Byrnes revealed this glimpse into Truman's
psyche.
Truman wanted the Soviet Union out of the
war, and his administration actually attempted to delay the Soviet
Union's entry into the war.
China was told by
high-ranking officials in the States Department to stall their negotiations
with the Soviet Union so that their entry into
the war would be delayed. Churchill
reported:
Mr.
Byrnes told me this morning that he had cabled to T.V. Soong advising him not
to give way on any point to the Russians, but to return to Moscow and keep on
negotiating pending further developments it is quite clear that the United
States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war
against Japan (Alperovitz, 270-271).
This
is concrete evidence that the United States
intended to stall the Soviet Union's entry
into the war. Brown’s diary also reveals
Byrnes hoped to delay the Soviet Union's entry
into the war by having the Chinese delay their negotiations: “[Byrnes] hopes
Soong will stand firm and then Russians will not go in war…. Then he feels Japan
will surrender before Russia
goes to war and this will save China. If Russia
goes in the war, he knows Stalin will take over and China will suffer” (Alperovitz,
267). This is further evidence which
supports the idea that the United States
tried to delay the Soviet Union's entry into
the war, because they hoped to limit Stalin's war gains. The United States feared the price of
Stalin’s help.
Even if the Soviet invasion had not
been delayed their invasion alone would not have been enough to force Japan to surrender: “Soviet intervention did not
invalidate the Ketsu-go military and political strategy; the Imperial Army had
already written off Manchuria (Frank,
347). The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was not readily apparent to the Japanese
populace. Even after the invasion the
Japanese “thought Japan
was winning the war. There was,
therefore, no public opinion pressing for peace—until the savage bombing of the
homeland” (Brooks, 116). General Umezu,
Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, was not distraught
after the invasion: “Although Russian attack has made the situation
unfavorable, I do not think we need abandon the opportunity to deliver one last
blow to America and England”
(Brooks, 79). He did not view the
Russian attack as a fatal blow to the Japanese military strategy.
Although Japanese military officials may
have realized that they would be unable to defeat America over the course of a long
protracted war, they hoped for one glorious military battle which would allow
them to gain better conditions than unconditional surrender. Koiso, near the end of the war, wanted to
throw Japan’s military resources into one all-out effort to win a battle before
seeking an end to the war: “Let’s make a peace overture only after such a victory
[because the terms of settlement would certainly be somewhat less onerous] if
we ride on the wave of victory [when suing for peace]” (Sigal, 33). One way to view this is that "[armies]
do not make the decision to end the wars the states, the nation’s leaders
calculate the likelihood that by continuing the war it can improve the terms of
settlement, compared with what it would presently obtain” (Sigal, 14). Following this logic it is possible and even
logical to continue a war after it is lost in the hope of obtaining better terms. Therefore the inevitability of Japan’s defeat,
which at times was obvious to both sides, is in itself not a good reason to delay
the use of the atomic bomb: military defeat and war termination are two very
different things.
The Call for Unconditional Surrender:
The Potsdam Declaration contained the
insistence on unconditional surrender, which consequently left the continued
existence of the Emperor ambiguous. This was a concern for the Japanese
officials and the Americans knew it.
Approximately five days before the Potsdam
conference was scheduled to begin American leaders, who had been able to
decipher the Japanese code, decoded Togo's
cable to Sato in Moscow:
“[It] is His Majesty’s heart’s desire to see the swift termination of the
war. In the Greater East Asia War,
however, as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender our
country has no alternative but to [fight on]” (Brooks, 156). It is apparent
then, that prior to the Potsdam conference the United States
did know that all issues pertaining to the Emperor were of the utmost
importance.
The Potsdam Declaration left the
position of the emperor up to interpretation and failed to clearly state his
fate. It failed to state whether the
emperor was "one of 'those who deceived and misled the people of Japan' whose
'authority and influence' were to be 'eliminated for all time,' or a war
criminal destined to face 'stern justice,' or part of a 'peacefully inclined
and responsible government' ” (Sigal, 143). The controversy was over a phrase suggested by
Byrnes to describe the government: "this may include a constitutional
monarchy under the present dynasty" (Bix, 91). There were some concerns that this wording had
multiple interpretations. It could be interpreted to mean that the United
Nations intended to “depose or execute the present Emperor and install some
other member of the Imperial family” or that it was “a commitment to continue
the institution of the Emperor and Emperor worship" (Frank, 220). After many debates the Joint Chiefs of Staff
finally decided on new language which they felt was less ambiguous: “Subject to
suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people
will be free to choose their own form of government” (Sigal, 132). Unfortunately, this was ambiguous as
well. The American government officials
believed that Japan
had the necessary military channels to clarify the conditions, but still in the
end the Potsdam Declaration said nothing about either the Soviet entry into the
war or the Emperor.
Truman was repeatedly urged to alter
the unconditional surrender conditions prior to the Potsdam Declaration. Truman was urged on fourteen separate
occasions to consider altering the unconditional surrender conditions:
by
Acting Secretary of State Grew, former President Herbert, Counsel to the
President Samuel I. Rosenman, Assistant Secretary of War, Admiral Leahy, State
Department in a formal recommendation of June 30, 1945; Under Secretary of the
Navy Ralph, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (Alperovitz, 300).
This
is undeniable proof that Truman was aware of the possible ramifications for
failing to alter the terms of unconditional surrender.
Truman was unable to alter the terms
of unconditional surrender because the cry for unconditional surrender was too
strong and had gained too much momentum: “Unconditional surrender… had become a
political shibboleth by the time Truman took office…. [Truman was not] ready to
retreat publicly from this path that Roosevelt
had blazed" (Sherwin, 225). Truman
became president because Roosevelt’s died. Truman's support for unconditional surrender
was reinforced as soon as he took office.
Truman reflected, "I was applauded frequently, and when I
reaffirmed the policy of unconditional surrender, the chamber rose to its feet”
(Sigal, 94). This support for Roosevelt's legacy made it difficult for Truman to alter
the terms of unconditional surrender.
This policy had come to symbolize the sacrifices that America had incurred during the war and it
represented a goal which America
had been fighting to obtain. There was
an "aura surrounding the Roosevelt legacy
of unconditional surrender" that Truman found almost impossible to go
against without firm, powerful, evidence and not mere speculation (Frank, 216).
Truman felt it difficult to
guarantee the position of the Emperor because of political concerns at home and
in Japan: “As wars draw to a close, officials do battle on two fronts at once:
on one, to bring the enemy state to terms, and on the other, to end the war in
a way that best serves their organizational interests” (Sigal, 23). Near the end of the war Truman did consider
changing the terms. However, the
consensus among many officials was that modifying the terms was not a prudent
course of action. MacLeish, serving as
Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Affairs, suggested there
would be “ ‘a very unfavorable public reaction’ to any reinterpretation of
unconditional surrender” (Sigal, 112).
This idea is supported by a poll that found most Americans hated the
Emperor. This poll asked people to pass
on the Emperor’s fate, and “33 percent of a national sample favored executing
him; 17 percent wanted him put on trial; 11 percent preferred imprisonment; and
9 percent favored exile” (Sigal, 95; Frank, 215). It is not a prudent course of
action to absolve the Emperor of all wartime responsibility when over 70% of
the American public felt that he should be exiled or even executed; popular
support for the war effort was essential for continuing the war against Japan.
Once Truman knew the atomic bomb had
been proven effective he felt the possible benefits did not outweigh the risks
inherent in clarifying the position of the Emperor:
[Hull warned: should] it fail the Japs would be encouraged
while terrible political repercussions would follow in the US. Would it be well first to await the climax of
allied bombing and Russia’s
entry into the war?” [Bynes concurred:]
“terrible political repercussions” were too great a risk (Sigal, 128).
Truman
agreed with Hull
and Bynes; he thought there was the risk of possible civil unrest at home and
that if they failed the Japanese would be encouraged to continue their fight to
the bitter end. Critics of the atomic
bomb’s use point out that after the war the Emperor was untouched, but once the
war was over, there was no longer the risk that his preservation would
encourage the Japanese to fight on. This
risk was nullified and even if there were a political backlash at home, it
would not interfere with the war effort, the war would have been won. The preceding points are essential to
understanding why the Emperor's position could not be clarified during the war.
After the Potsdam Declaration—the Necessity of the Bomb:
Japan's response to the Potsdam
Declaration was ambiguous. The Japanese
military officials had an almost impossible task. If they were to release anything they needed
to satisfy many different groups within Japan. They needed to find a way to:
strike
a balance between the cabinet’s decision not to say anything that would destroy
the possibility of negotiating for better terms through Moscow and a certain necessity for it to say
something that would appease the military’s demand for a strongly worded
rebuttal and would also satisfy the expectations of the misguided masses
(Butow, 144).
There
was no immediate official response, instead it was a Japanese newspaper the United States looked to for Japan’s answer. In response to the Potsdam Declaration
Japanese official Suzuki used the word mokusatsu: "[Suzuki's] phrase,
mokusatsu, passed out of the conference room Friday afternoon and found its way
onto the front pages of Japan’s Saturday morning papers” (Butow, 146). The word, mokusatsu, does not have one
translation into English: “For a person who was privy to the cabinet’s decision
mokusatsu may have conveyed the meaning of “withholding comment” (Butow,
144). However, it can also be
interpreted to mean "to reject."
Therefore their response was unclear and did not transmit to the United States a
willingness to accept the Potsdam Declaration.
Japan's response to the Potsdam Declaration
gave Truman and the nation further evidence that Japan needed to be compelled to
surrender. The allied newspapers interpreted
the word mokusatsu to mean “reject" (Brooks, 164). Truman concurred with this definition and said,
“[Japan's]
leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum” (Brooks, 164). Since the American newspapers reported the
interpretation of the controversial word to mean "reject" Japan was able to see America's interpretation of their
response. However, “there is no record
of an effort by the Japanese government to overtly or covertly transmit to the
Allies any hint that mokusatsu did not precisely reflect its attitude” (Frank,
234). Additionally if Hirohito, who read
the newspapers daily, had been concerned about the ambiguity of Japan's
response and possible misinterpretation of its meaning, to this very day
"we have no record of it" (Bix, 91).
Japan's
secret cables intercepted and decoded by the United
States failed to suggest Japan had any desire to
surrender. James F. Byrnes memoirs suggest
that there was no reason to delay the use of the atomic bomb. A decoded cable from Japanese militarists to
Japan’s Ambassador in Moscow
read:
“We
cannot consent to unconditional surrender under any circumstances. Even if the war drags on, so long as the
enemy demands unconditional surrender we will fight as one man against the
enemy in accordance with the Emperor’s command.” Byrnes said, “That cable, which we
intercepted, depressed me terribly. It
meant using the atomic bomb; it probably meant Russia’s entry into the war”
(Sigal, 7).
When
the United States
intercepted this cable, Byrnes was "depressed" because he knew that
it was infeasible to alter America's
call for unconditional surrender and this would most likely mean that the
atomic bomb would have to be used against Japan.
Even if the preservation of the Emperor
were guaranteed there is substantial evidence this clarification would not have
led to Japan’s
surrender. America
intercepted a cable dialogue between Sato and Foreign Minister Togo, which
supports this claim. In this dialogue,
which was made available to American officials, Sato informed Foreign Minister Togo that the best terms Japan could
obtain were unconditional surrender with the stipulation that the Imperial
institution could remain. When Sato suggested the best Japan could hope for was to keep the Emperor,
but otherwise accept the unconditional surrender, “Togo in unambiguous language and in
the name of the cabinet absolutely rejected such terms: ‘We are unable to
consent to it under any circumstances whatsoever’ ” (Frank, 230). This dialogue led American officials to believe
the demand for unconditional surrender need not be modified.
Additionally, information not available
to American officials during the war shows the necessity of the atomic bomb, as
the Japanese were not on the verge of surrendering after receiving the Potsdam
Declaration. There was some debate in Japan as to whether Japan should surrender. Japan's
leading businessman urged Suzuki to accept the Potsdam terms. This evidence has been used by those who
support the idea that Japan
was on the verge of surrendering, but upon examining Suzuki's reply it becomes
quite clear that this was not the case:
[For]
the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force
them also to end the war. That is why
they are talking about unconditional surrender.
Precisely at a time like this if we hold firm they will yield before we
do. Just because they have broadcast
their Declaration, it is not necessary to stop fighting. You advisers may ask me to reconsider but I
don’t think there is any need to stop [the war]
(Frank, 235).
This
statement reveals many important things about the Japanese military plan. It suggests that not modifying the terms of
the Potsdam Declaration to guarantee the position of the Emperor was actually
the right course of action. Suzuki used
the Potsdam Declaration that made no such guarantee to create the idea that
"circumstances have arisen that force them to end the war." This is exactly the view that the Truman
administration wisely wanted to avoid.
Furthermore, his statement that "at a time like this if we hold
firm they will yield before we do" shows that, to Suzuki winning
militarily was not important but winning the “battle of wills” was. Before the use of the atomic bomb Suzuki felt
that the Japanese would be able to win the “battle of wills” and outlast the
Americans, because America
was looking for a way out of the war.
Suzuki had no intention of surrendering, and clarifying the position of
the Emperor would have only helped him continue his cry for war.
Even after the use of the atomic
bomb the Japanese were divided on whether to surrender: “Only on August 9,
after withstanding months of blockade and bombardment, obvious preparations for
invasion, two atomic bombs, and Soviet intervention, did the Big Six formulate
terms for ending the war” (Frank, 344).
Unfortunately the Big Six were unable to come to a conclusion. There were two opposing plans. A plan with four conditions and the foreign
minister's plan which was to surrendering with only the first condition:
1.
A guarantee that the imperial family will continue to reign.
2.
Disarmament of the armed forces by Japan herself.
3.
Trial of war criminals by Japan
herself.
4. Occupation of Japan to be limited to the minimum
time and places.
It was suggested that these conditions be preliminary to
our acceptance of the Potsdam
terms (Brooks, 77).
The atomic bomb allowed Japan to surrender. It convinced the Emperor to intervene and
break the deadlock in favor of accepting the Potsdam Declaration. Why did the Emperor finally intervene? When he originally urged his officials to
accept the terms and surrender for Japan's better good he gave three
reasons: "a collapse of domestic morale” and two military concerns:
“inadequate preparation to resist the invasion and the vast destructiveness of
the atomic bomb and the air attacks”
(Frank, 345). There was no
mention of the Soviet intervention, and two of his three reasons related to the
atomic bomb: "collapse of domestic moral [as a result of] the vast
destructiveness of the atomic bomb…." It is true, however, that later on
August 14 when he restated his position he did cite both the Soviet Union's
intervention and "scientific power" (Frank, 345). This time he did mention the Soviet Union, but the Emperor still mentioned the atomic
bomb. Therefore, there is no logical way
one could conclude that the atomic bomb was not a major factor in his decision
to intervene:
Neither
the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war convinced Japan
to surrender. However the shock of both,
especially the use of the atomic bomb gave the people the opportunity and the
Emperor a sense of urgency to become involved which allowed people to involve
him which may have ended the war. (Sigal, 279).
The atomic bomb allowed the military
establishment an honorable way out of the war. Suzuki’s analysis: “If military
leaders could convince themselves that they were defeated by the power of
science but not by lack of spiritual power or strategic errors, they could save
face to some extent” (Frank, 347). Japanese officials were able to believe that
they were not ruined by a lack of honor, but by science.
CONCLUSION:
Truman’s main motivation for using the
atomic bomb was to force Japan
to surrender. Some revisionist
historians have suggested that Truman unnecessarily prolonged the war in order
to use the atomic bomb. Truman may have
delayed the Soviet Union’s entrance into the
war, but he had commendable reasons. If
the Soviet Union participated in Japan’s defeat Stalin would expect
post-war concessions. Once Truman knew
that the United States
possessed the atomic bomb he hoped to use this technology to defeat Japan without
the high cost of Stalin’s assistance.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's entrance into the war, in and of itself,
would not have been enough to force Japan’s surrender, because it did not
interfere with Japan’s plan for one glorious military battle to break America’s
will to continue the war. Truman could
not modify the demand for unconditional surrender because it had gained too
much momentum. The Emperor was extremely
unpopular in America and
Truman was concerned about a political backlash if he went against Roosevelt’s call for unconditional surrender. Likewise, in Japan,
Truman feared that this clarification could actually inspire the Japanese to
fight on and give them the false hope that the United
States would allow Japan to end the war on terms
better than unconditional surrender.
This danger was real as Suzuki used the Potsdam Declaration, which did
not modify the terms of unconditional surrender, to support the idea that the United States'
resolve was weakening. Additionally, Japan’s “rejection” of the Potsdam Declaration
and intercepted cables further led Truman to believe that Japan was not
on the verge of surrendering. In the end
it was the atomic bomb, perhaps coupled with the Soviet
Union’s invasion, which led to the end of the war. When Emperor Hirohito finally surrendered he
cited the atomic bomb in both surrender speeches and the Soviet invasion in
one. The atomic bomb played a key role
in convincing the Emperor to surrender.
The use of the atomic bomb was both justified and necessary to draw the
war to a rapid and definite conclusion.
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Alperovitz,
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Herbert P. "Japan's
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"The Cost of the Manhattan
Project" http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/manhattn.htm (5 Dec. 2000).
Butow,
Robert J. C. Japan’s Decision to Surrender. Stanford
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Frank,
Richard B. Downfall: the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. Random
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Martin J. A World Destroyed: the
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Scientists, leaders talk about science, the war and the bomb."
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